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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
WORKM N'S COMPENSATION-DISABILITY AWADs-SuRvIVAL OF RIGHT
To ACCRuED PAY N s-After a workmen's compensation disability
award for a non-scheduled injury,1 plaintiff's intestate died from
causes unrelated to the injury before any payment had been made
on the award. 2 He left no dependents. The administrator recovered
a judgment in excess of $5,000 for the portion of the award which had
accrued at the date of the intestate's death, and the employer ap-
pealed. Held: Affirmed. Claims for accrued, unpaid workmen's com-
pensation become, on the death of the claimant, an asset of his estate
recoverable by his personal representative, even though claimant
leaves no dependents. Brewer v. Caudill, 814 S.W. 2d 550 (Ky. 1958).
Most jurisdictions, including Kentucky, have no express statutory
provision covering this problem. Consideration of the purpose of
workrnen's compensation is especially important because there are
no Kentucky precedents, and analogous cases in other jurisdictions
turn largely upon the variations in workmen's compensation statutes.
Two interrelated problems are presented: (1) What part, if any,
of a disability award is recoverable after the claimant's death? (2)
Who is entitled to recover?
In the absence of express statutory provision, the prevailing view
is that unaccrued benefits are not recoverable after the claimant's
death.3 The Kentucky Court, following this view, has reasoned that
the remaining, undue and uncollected weekly payments were in no
sense allowances to dependents, but were awards to the workman
solely "for the impairment of his power to earn for the benefit of
himself and his dependents."4 Although there is authority for the
contrary view, the only cases found which have so held are sched-
uled-injury cases,5 in which the compensation, unlike a disability
1 Certain injuries listed in a statutory schedule, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.105
(1959), are compensated irrespective of disability. If the injury is not specified
in such a schedule, compensation is allowed for the resulting disability. Ky. Rev.
Stat. §§ 342.095, .100, .110 (1959).
2The injury occurred in 1951, and the claimant died in 1955, some three
months after the final award, which was delayed by litigation of the question
whether the deceased was the defendant's employee at the time of the injury.
See Brewer v. Millich, 276 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky., 1955).
3 Cranford v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 261 F. 2d 8 (10th Cir. 1958); 2
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 58.40 (1952).
4 See Harrison v. Tierney Mining Co., 276 Ky. 637, 642, 124 S.W. 2d 757,
759 (1938). This was a case of a compensable injury resulting in death more than
two years after the injury. Unless death occurred within two years of the injury,
the statute did not entitle dependents to death benefits. The court failed to stretch
the application of the statute to compensate the dependents for a work-connected
death. In view of this case, it would seem even more logical to deny recovery of
unaccrued benefits in the much weaker case of a death resulting from other than
a work-connected injury. A provision was subsequently enacted allowing de-
pendents to recover the remainder of the award in substitution for a claimant
whose death resulted from a compensable injury. Ky. Acts 1942, ch. 94, succeeded
by Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.111 (1959).
5Parker v. Walgreen Drug Co., 63 Ariz. 374, 162 P. 2d 427 (1945); Mahoney
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award, is for the specified injury itself, and not for the loss of wages.
It is reasoned that, since the award is for a definite amount, fixed
without relation to the employee's ability to earn a living, the right
to the compensation vests in him upon the making of an award, even
though enjoyment of the benefits is delayed by monthly payment
provisions. It should be noted that the latter view is not always
adopted even in scheduled-injury cases,6 but the difference in theory
offers a rational basis for differentiating as to the survival of the
right to recover accrued or unaccrued benefits.
Recovery of accrued benefits, on the other band, is commonly
allowed, 7 and the cases do not reveal any distinction between sched-
uled and non-scheduled injury awards." Some cases have held that
even accrued portions of an award can not be recovered after the
claimant's death.9 In each of these cases the court was confronted
with special statutory provisions, such as non-assignability of benefits,
although the true basis was more likely the notion that such com-
pensation was intended as a personal benefit to workmen and their
dependents, and that enrichment of persons outside these classes
was neither contemplated nor warranted under any circumstances.
In a case in which there were apparently accrued disability benefits,
the Arizona Court held that although no part of the compensation
award could be recovered after the claimant's death, the adminis-
trator could recover medical payments to the extent the deceased
had paid or become indebted for treatment and thereby depleted
his estate.' 0 The distinction is necessary to prevent the injury from
causing an affirmative hardship where there are dependents, and
even if there are none, the result can be reconciled with a denial of
the survivability of disability compensation, since medical benefits
are in theory close to scheduled-injury awards.
Nevertheless, the question of survival of an award, or portion
thereof, should not be resolved without regard to the class of per-
v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 443, 133 P. 2d 927 (1943). In 2 Larson, Workmen's
Comensation § 58.40 n. 65 (1952), four cases are cited to support this proposi-
tion,but only the cases here cited are in point.0 E.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Ryan, 69 R. I. 347, 83 A. 2d 188 (1943);
Bry-Block Mercantile Co. v. Carson, 154 Tenn. 273, 288 S.W. 726 (1926);
Heiselt Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 59, 197 Pac. 589 (1921); Ray
v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 99 Wash. 176, 168 Pac. 1121 (1917).
7 2 Larson, op. cit. supra note 8, at 52 n. 64.
8 Compare Greenwood v. Luby, 105 Conn. 398, 135 AUt. 578 (1926), with
Bry-Block Mercantile Co. v. Carson, 154 Tenn. 273, 288 S.W. 726 (1926).
9 E.g., Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 P. 2d 1024 (Ariz.,
1940); State ex rel. Rowland v. Industrial Comm'n, 126 Ohio St. 23, 183 N.E.
787 (1932); Bozzeli v. Industrial Comm'n, 122 Ohio St. 201, 171 N.E. 108(1930); Ray v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 99 Wash. 176, 168 Pac. 1121 (1917).
In the first two cases it does not appear whether there were depedents; there were
none in the latter two.10 Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 9.
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sons to be benefited, and this appears to be reflected in the cases."
There were no dependents in the principal case, and the brief for
the appellant states that the deceased had no known relatives in the
United States, so that the balance of the recovery not expended on
administration expenses, attorney fees, and claims of creditors, will
probably escheat to the state.12 If there were dependents, a denial
of recovery of accrued benefits would be contrary to the spirit of
the statute, since there are express provisions for dependents in two
instances, both of which relate to death as a result of a compensable
injury.13 In these sections, the only ones dealing with payment after
a claimant's death, recovery is limited to dependents,'14 and the reason
and equity in allowing recovery of benefits by a personal representa-
tive where an injury has resulted in death appear to be greater
than in the case of disability awards.
The appellant relied on the section of the statute making com-
pensation and claims therefor non-assignable and exempt from claims
of creditors.15 Assignability is not a proper test for survivability since
this kind of statutory provision would appear to be for the special
purpose of protecting a class of persons against their own improvi-
dence.16 Moreover, the statutory exemption does not show an inten-
tion that creditors should not be paid when, as here, the welfare of
a workman or his dependents is not involved. On the contrary, the
fact that the deceased may have been extended credit during the
unfortunately prolonged litigation is the strongest argument in sup-
port of the court's decision, as the legislative purpose to benefit
workmen may be achieved indirectly insofar as the decision might
tend to encourage the extension of such credit. This is not a proper
way to insure prompt payment of compensation, however. A liti-
gant should not be penalized for pursuing his legal remedies to the
limits allowed by law, and the legislature could enforce prompt
"lThe opinion of the court in the principal case cites 58 Am. Jur. Work-
men's Compensation § 578 (1948), as authority for the proposition that accrued
benefits are recoverable. However, four of the six cases there cited clearly show
dependents, one case is not clear on this point, and the sixth is distinguishable
on the law and facts.
'
2 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 393.020 (1959).
13 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.070 (1950), provides for death benefits to be paid
dependents of a workman whose death results from a compensable injury within
two years; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 842.111 (1959), provides for payment to dependents
of all allowed and unpaid awards, not to exceed the amount payable for death.
4At the time of the injury in the principal case, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.070
(1948), provided that where death resulted from a compensable injury within two
years and there were no dependents, burial expenses not to exceed $800, medical
expenses, and the sum of $200 were to be paid the personal representative.
This latter sum does not approach the $5,000 (approximate) recovery in the
principal case, and even this nominal payment was eliminated by Ky. Acts 1956,
ch. 77, § 5.
'5 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 842.180 (1959).16 Monson v. Battelle, 102 Kan. 208, 170 Pac. 801 (1918).
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payment after a final award by imposing a fine or penalty for delay.
Workmen's compensation statutes normally are not construed
to create an asset for the estate of a deceased claimant, and the right
to recover, which is purely statutory, ought not be extended by the
courts unless the purposes of this non-fault legislation are being
furthered.
The ultimate 'social philosophy, then, behind non-fault compensa-
tion liability is the desirability of providing, in the most efficient, most
dignified and most certain form, financial and medical benefits which
an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any
case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of
these payments to the most appropriate source of payment.17
So the making of an award for disability, far from being an ad-
versary recovery of damages by an injured plaintiff from a defend-
ant guilty of some kind of constructive responsibility for the acci-
dent, is rather the signal for the setting in motion of a scheme of
social protection which goes no further in nature, amount or duration
than the necessities of that protection require.la
This expresses the idea that no more burden should be passed on to
the consumer of the product than is necessary to carry out the pur-
poses of workmen's compensation. An award which will escheat to
the state or even one which will go to creditors or heirs does not meet
this test. Though the public has an interest in prompt payment of
such claims and the discouragement of frivolous litigation, good
faith claims and defenses should not be discouraged.
Unless the statute clearly provides otherwise, the following rules
are suggested as being consonant with these considerations and
with the purposes of workmen's compensation legislation: (1) in
case of scheduled injuries the right to compensation should be held
to vest in the employee at the time of the injury and to pass to the
personal representative whether or not there are dependents; (2)
in case of non-scheduled injuries the right to compensation should
be held to vest in the employee only as payments accrue during his
lifetime, and after his death recovery should be allowed only by de-
pendents and only to the extent of accrued benefits.
Kenneth B. Kusch
17 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 2.20, at 6 (1952).
L8 Id. § 2.60, at 12.
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